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LEE v. WEISMAN: A NEW AGE FOR 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE? * 
ELIZABETH BARKER BRANDT·· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's most recent opinion in the area of the 
Establishment Clause, while purporting not to question existing 
precedent, injects a new standard - coercion - into the re-
quirements for proving an Establishment Clause violation. In 
the majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman,! Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, O'Connor and Stevens, os-
tensibly declined to overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the touch-
stone of the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. Surprisingly, however, other than declining to reconsider 
Lemon and mentioning the case in the context of reviewing the 
holdings of the lower courts, Justice Kennedy never again cited 
Lemon in his opinion. He did not undertake an identifiable anal-
ysis or application of the three elements of the Lemon test. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun engaged in a 
traditional application of Lemon. Justice Souter analyzed and 
adopted the historical interpretation which underlies Lemon in a 
• An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual convention of the 
National Organization of Legal Problems in Education in Orlando, Florida, November 
20-22, 1991. In addition, a small portion of this article was previously published in 
Elizabeth Barker Brandt and Alan Kofoed, Does the Camel Have His Nose in the Tent? 
Individual Religious Freedom v. Prayer in Public Schools, 34 THE ADVOCATE 13 (March 
1991) and has been incorporated in this article with the gracious permission of Alan 
Kofoed and the Idaho State Bar Association . 
•• Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. B.A., The College of 
Wooster; J.D., Case Western Reserve University. I would like to thank Garry Erickson 
for his research assistance. I would also like to thank my colleagues, Myron Schreck and 
James Macdonald, for their valuable insights on the topics in this article. 
1. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
535 
1
Brandt: Lee v. Weisman
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
536 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:535 
second concurring opinion. Both Justices Souter and Blackmun 
(and presumably Justices Stevens and O'Connor who joined 
them) went to varying lengths in their concurring opinions to 
distance themselves from the coercion standard adopted by Jus-
tice Kennedy. 
Thus, despite the apparent affirmation of Lemon by the ma-
jority of the Court, Lee, at best, must be viewed in light of Ken-
nedy's opinion as further marginalizing Lemon as a useful tool 
of Establishment Clause analysis. Instead, in the future, Justice 
Kennedy's coercion analysis will control the outcome of Estab-
lishment Clause cases. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion fo-
cused on the degree of involvement of state officials in fashion-
ing the religious exercise in question3 and the coercive aspects of 
state religious activities." 
In this article, I will first review the Court's Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence to date, with special attentio~ to the issue 
of school prayer. Second, I will synthesize the major historical 
arguments driving the Court's analysis in this area. Third, I will 
summarize and analyze the opinions in Lee, their impact on ex-
isting jurisprudence and their importance for future cases in this 
area. 
II. U.S. SUPREME COURT STANDARD IN ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE CASES BEFORE LEE 
The Supreme Court first struggled with the application of 
the Establishment Clause to school prayer in the 1960's. In two 
cases, the Court held that reading officially-sanctioned prayers 
during the school day, whether or not composed by government 
officials and regardless of denominational neutrality, violated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, even where 
participation in those prayers was voluntary. II In Engel v. 
Vitale,6 the Court overturned a practice of reading a prayer 
composed by school officials saying, "[W]e think that by using 
its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' 
3. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655·57. 
4. Id. at 2657·61. 
5. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
6. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly 
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause."7 The Engel Court 
reasoned that, "[TJhe First Amendment was added to the Con-
stitution to serve as a guarantee that neither the power nor the 
prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, 
support or influence the kinds of prayers American People can 
say .... "B Although it pointed to the ultimate coercive effect of 
government exercises of religion as a rationale for its holding, 
the court concluded that it was the government's adoption of a 
prayer that offended the First Amendment, not the coercive na-
ture of the prayer.s The majority recognized that because the 
prayer was so "brief and general", the New York practice did 
not amount to a "total establishment of one particular religious 
sect to the exclusion of all others."lo However, it concluded, cit-
ing the words of James Madison, that, "'[iJt is proper to take 
alarm at the first experiment on our liberties' .... "11 
The majority's reasoning in Engel was based on a historical 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause which emphasized 
the writings of Jefferson and Madison surrounding the passage 
of the Virgipia Bill for Religious Liberty,12 as well as the Colo-
nial opposition to the English Book of Common Prayer. IS This 
reasoning falls squarely within a historical view of the First 
Amendment, formulated over thirty years primarily through the 
opinions of Justices Black and Rutledge. a 
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Iii the 
Court expanded upon the BlacklRutledge formulation of the 
First Amendment in striking down Pennsylvania and Maryland 
statutes which required, among other things, the daily reading of 
7. [d. at 424. 
8. [d. at 429. 
9. [d. at 430. 
10. [d. at 436. 
11. [d. (quoting Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, IX 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 at 185-86, (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
12. [d. at 427-29. For a discussion of Madison's and Jefferson's views, see infra notes 
72-88 and accompanying text. 
13. [d. at 425-27. 
14. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-61 (2d ed. 1988). 
Borrowing from Professor Tribe, I will refer to this view of the First Amendment as the 
"BlacklRutledge" interpretation. 
15. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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Bible verses and recitation of the Lord's PrayerlS in public 
schools. There, the Court reasoned: 
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's 
cases speak thus stems from a recognition of the 
teachings of history that powerful sects or groups 
might bring about a fusion of governmental and 
religious functions or a concert of dependency of 
one upon the other to the end that official sup-
port of. the state or federal government would be 
placed behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies. 
This the Establishment Clause prohibits . . . . 
[T]he Establishment Clause has. been considered 
by this Court eight times in the past score of 
years and, . . . it has been consistently held that 
the clause withdrew all legislative power respect-
ing religious belief or the expression thereof. The 
test may be stated as follows: what are the pur-
pose and primary effect of the enactment? If ei-
ther is the advancement or inhibition of religion 
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legisla-
tive power as circumscribed by the Constitution. I7 
These early school prayer cases and several later cases, all 
adopting the BlacklRutledge formulation of the First Amend-
ment, have together become the basis of the Court's test in eval-
uating whether a violation of the Establishment Clause has oc-
curred. That test was first fully articulated in Lemon u. 
Kurtzman.ls The three part standard formulated in Lemon re-
quires that the state action "must have a secular ... purpose; 
... its primary ·or principal effect must be one that ~either ad-
vances nor inhibits religion ... [and it] must not foster 'an ex-
cessive governmental entanglement'."19 The Court has consist-
ently applied the Lemon test in every Establishment Clause 
decision since it was adopted, with the exception of Marsh u. 
Chambers20 and now, arguably, Lee. 
16. Matthew 6:5-6. 
17. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. 
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
19. [d. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 674 (1970)) (citations 
omitted). Lemon did not deal with school prayer, but instead involved a successful chal-
lenge to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes which gave financial support to church 
sponsored schools. [d. at 607-11. 
20. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). But see Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (imply-
4
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Marsh addressed the question of whether prayer at the be-
ginning of legislative sessions violated the Establishment 
Clause.21 The Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska state legisla-
ture's practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer, led 
by a chaplain who was paid by the state.22 The Court did not 
apply the Lemon test and overturned the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion which had been based on Lemon.23 Instead, the Court rea-
soned that because the practice of prayer before the Nebraska 
legislative session was so embedded in the history of our country 
and had become a deep-seated tradition, it did not constitute an 
impermissible establishment of religion. 24 
Key to the Court's holding was its analysis of the history of 
legislative prayer in the Colonial legislatures and the Continen-
tal Congress. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the six member 
majority, reasoned, "[t]he opening of Legislative and other de-
liberative bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history 
and tradition of this country. From colonial times through the 
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legisla-
tive prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment 
and religious freedom. "2& After analyzing the historical record 
regarding legislative prayer, with detailed attention to the Con-
gressional debates surrounding the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights, Justice Burger concluded: 
This unique history leads us to accept the inter-
pretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who 
saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause 
arising from a practice of prayer similar to that 
now challenged. We conclude that legislative 
prayer presents no more potential for establish-
ment than the provision of school transportation, 
. . . beneficial grants for higher education,. . . or 
tax exemptions for religious organizations.28 
The Court limited the scope of its decision by cautioning: 
ing that Lemon may not apply in cases involving questions of denominational 
neutrality). 
21. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784-85. 
22. [d. at 795. 
23. [d. at 786, reu'g 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982). 
24. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-89. 
25. [d. at 786. But see North Carolina Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 
1145 (4th Cir. 1991). 
26. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (citations omitted). 
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Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify 
contemporary violations of constitutional guaran-
tees, but there is far more here than simply his-
torical patterns. In this context, historical evi-
dence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen 
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but 
also on how they thought that clause applied to 
the practice authorized by the First Congress 
27 
Even though the Court continued to apply the Lemon test 
after Marsh was decided, that test came under increasing scru-
tiny and criticism. In Lynch v. Donnelly,28 decided the year af-
ter Marsh, the Court applied the Lemon test in holding that a 
creche displayed as part of a municipal Christmas celebration 
did not violate the Establishment Clause. Even so, the Court 
seemed to back away from Lemon in Lynch, indicating that 
while it would not view its decision-making process as mechani-
cally limited by its decision in Lemon, that test was "useful" in 
evaluating Establishment Clause cases.29 
In Wallace v. Jajree,30 the majority followed Lemon in 
striking down an Alabama statute which authorized a moment 
of silence "for meditation and voluntary prayer";31 however, Jus-
tice O'Connor suggested modifying the test in her concurring 
opinion32 and Justice Rehnquist suggested abandoning the test 
altogether in his dissent.33 The Wallace plurality applied Lemon 
in evaluating the following series of Alabama statutes: the first 
authorized a moment of silence for meditation; the second stat-
ute, amending the first, authorized a moment of silence "for 
meditation and voluntary prayer"; and the third authorized 
teachers to lead prayers.34 The Court struck down the second . 
and third statutes, concluding that the moment of silence "for 
medita~ion and voluntary prayer" violated the first part of the 
27. [d. at 790. 
28. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
29. [d. at 679. 
30. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
31. [d. at 61. 
32. [d. at 67 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
33. [d. at 91 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
34. [d. at 40-41, n. 1-3. 
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Lemon test requiring that the statute have a secular purpose.3Ci 
According to the Court, that test requires that state actions be 
invalidated if they are "entirely motivated by a purpose to ad-
vance religion."36 The Court examined the legislative record and 
determined that the legislation had no secular purpose, based on 
the testimony of the bill's sponsor that he saw the legislation as 
one step toward re-establishing prayer in public schools. 
Justices Powell and O'Connor filed separate concurring 
opinions. Both agreed that some "moment of silence" provisions 
would not be unconstitutional. Quoting her earlier concurring 
opinion in Lynch, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
[R]eligious liberty protected by the Establish-
ment Clause is infringed when the government 
makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's 
standing in the political community. Direct gov-
ernment action endorsing religion or a particular 
religious practice is invalid under this approach 
because it sends a message to non adherents that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the .politi-
cal community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community .... Under this view, 
Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a 
statute requires courts to examine whether gov-
ernment's purpose is to endorse religion and 
whether the statute actually conveys a message of 
endorsement.37 
O'Connor's gloss tightens the Lemon test by requiring that 
the government action actually have the affirmative purpose and 
effect of conveying a message endorsing religion rather than sim-
ply advancing or inhibiting religion; arguably the standard per-
mits more room for passive governmental accommodations of re-
ligious exercise.38 . 
Justice O'Connor explained that because the second and 
third Alabama statutes "were enacted solely to officially en-
35. [d. at 59-61; see also, id. at 76-79 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
36. [d. at 56. 
37. [d. at 69 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
38. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1212-13. 
7
Brandt: Lee v. Weisman
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
542 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:535 
courage prayer during the moment of silence," they were uncon-
stitutional. However, she reasoned that a moment of silence was 
distinguishable from situations involving vocal prayer: 
A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public 
schools is different from state-sponsored vocal 
prayer or Bible reading. First, a moment of si-
lence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike 
prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated 
with a religious exercise. Second, a pupil who par-
ticipates in a moment of silence need not compro-
mise his or her beliefs. During a moment of si-
lence, a student who objects to prayer is left to 
his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to 
listen to the prayers or thoughts of others. For 
these simple reasons a moment of silence statute 
does not stand or fall under the Establishment 
Clause according to how the Court views vocal 
prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and at least one 
Member of this Court have recognized the dis-
tinction. and suggested that a moment of silence 
in public schools would be constitutional. See 
[School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)] (Brennan, J., con-
curring)("[T]he observance of a moment of rever-
ent silence at the opening of class" may serve 
"the solely secular purposes of the devotional ac-
tivities without jeopardizing either the religious 
liberties of any members of the community or the 
proper degree of separation between the spheres 
of religion and government" . . . .)89 
In order to determine if a moment of silence statute violates 
the Constitution, Justice O'Connor explained that the statute's 
"history, language and administration" should be examined 
through a "deferential and limited" inquiry to determine if it 
"operates as an endorsement of religion."40 She concluded that, 
"the relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted 
with the text, legislative history and implementation of the stat-
ute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public 
39. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(adopted in the concurring 
opinion by Justice Powell at 472 U.S. at 62, n.2). 
40. ld. at 74. 
8
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schools. "41 
In his dissenting opinion in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that the Lemon test was based on the faulty historical 
concept that the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a 
wall between church and state.42 Instead, he argued that the 
"[F]ramers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the 
designation of any church as a 'national' one" and to "stop the 
Federal Government from asserting a preference for one reli-
gious denomination or sect over others. "43 Thus, he argued that 
the Establishment Clause does not require government to be 
neutral on questions of religion and does not prevent the state 
from accomplishing "legitimate secular ends through nondis-
criminatory sectarian means."" 
Despite these challenges to the Lemon formula, it had been 
consistently applied by the Court to test the validity of state 
action under the Establishment Clause. Most recently the Court 
applied Lemon in Edwards v. Aguillard,"" County of Allegheny 
v. American Civil Liberties Union48 and Board of Education v. 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens. 47 
Cases such as Wallace, County of Allegheny, Edwards and 
Mergens, however, continued the marginalization of the Lemon 
Establishment Clause formula. The Edwards case tested the va-
lidity of a Louisiana statute which required that "creation sci-
ence" be taught in public schools if "evolution science" is 
taught. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, filed a strong 
dissent,"8 concluding that the Lemon Establishment Clause test 
should be abandoned.49 
41. [d. at 76. 
42. [d. at 91-113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
43. [d. at 113. 
44. [d. 
45 .. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
46. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
47. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
48. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 610 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
49. [d. at 640 ("Abandoning Lemon's purpose test - a test which exacerbates the 
tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the lan-
guage or history of the Amendment, and, as today's decision shows, has wonderfully flex-
ible consequences - would be a good place to start [reforming Establishment Clause 
doctrine]."). 
9
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In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy filed a strong concurring and 
dissenting opinion which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
and Justices Scalia and White. IIO In that opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy first expressed his view that the Lemon formulation of the 
establishment test should be substantially revised. III He then 
reasoned that even if the test was not revised, the creche display 
at issue should have been validated under Lemon.1I2 Justice Ken-
nedy, relying in part on Marsh v. Chambers, concluded: "Non-
coercive government action within the realm ·of flexible accom-
modation or passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does 
not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion 
in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that 
are accepted in our national heritage."113 
Justice Kennedy's reliance on Marsh and his approach to 
Lemon turned on his reasoning that some form of coercion 
should be part of an Establishment Clause violation. He stated 
that "[o]ur cases disclose two limiting principles: government 
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion 
or its exercise; and it may not in the guise of avoiding hostility 
or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a 
degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious 
faith or tends to do so.' "114 
Finally, in Mergens, a majority of the Court held that the 
Federal Equal Access Actllll did not violate the Establishment 
Clause by impermissibly endorsing religion.1I6 However, in a con-
curring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, re-
jeded O'Connor's endorsement gloss on Lemon as having "insuf-
ficient content" to be dispositive. II? Instead, Justice Kennedy 
again argued that if the act did not" 'give direct benefits to reli-
gion in such a degree that it in fact established a [state] religion 
or religious faith or tends to do so'" and if it did not "coerce 
50. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
51. Id. at 656 ("substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in 
order .... "). 
52. Id. at 655. 
53. Id. at 662-63. 
54. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch, 456 U.S. at 678). 
55. 20 U.S.C. §§4071-74 (1986). 
56. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249-50 (O'Connor, J., writing for the plurality, joined on 
this point by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Blackmun, J.). 
57. Id. at 261. 
10
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any student to participate in a religious activity", then it was 
permissible.1I8 
A. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE DEBATE 
The curre:nt debate on the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause illustrated by the preceding cases turns on two divergent 
interpretations of the framing of the Establishment Clause. This 
divergence and accompanying debate can only be understood by 
examining both the historical context in which the clause was 
framed and the clause's major sources. 
The intent of the drafters of the First Amendment must be 
understood in an eighteenth century context. That context was 
one in which establishments of religion were common in the dif-
ferent colonies and in early statehood.1I9 Most of Madison's and 
Jefferson's writings on religious freedom were composed in the 
context of a bitter struggle to disestablish the Anglican Church 
in ·Virginia. Even in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, colonies 
known for religious tolerance, government entanglements with 
religion existed.80 Simply, the Protestant or Christian religion 
occupied a more central role in the minds of eighteenth century 
Americans than it does in the minds of twentieth century Amer-
icans. As Steven Smith81 points out, "the thinking of most eight-
eenth century Americans was not only pervasively religious; it 
was, more specifically, pervasively Protestant."82 
58. Id. at 260 (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S at 659 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) and Lynch, 465 U.s. at 678). 
59. For a discussion of religious establishment in the Colonies and during early 
statehood see LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 71-90, 118-19 (rev. ed. 1962). 
60.Id. 
61. Steven Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablish-
ment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REV. 955, 966-67 (1989). 
62. Id. at 966, citing Henry May's observation that "we may be able to understand 
[eighteenth century American) political thought better if we start where they nearly al-
ways did, with religion." HENRY MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA xiii-xiv (1976). 
See also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE 
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 78-79 (1986) ("[Eighteenth Century Americans') con-
science as to religious freedom was firmly embedded in a Christian and Protestant world 
view. Colonial writers proclaimed liberty of conscience, but they grounded that liberty in 
the unexamined assumption that the legal systems of the time would uphold and main-
tain a Christian and Protestant State. ") 
11
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Within this pervasively religious world view, scholars have 
identified three sources of thought regarding government estab-
lishment of religion upon which the BlacklRutledge interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment largely rests.68 The first source is 
attributed primarily to Roger Williams. In Rhode Island, Wil-
liams and his followers developed a successful colonial model of 
religious tolerance during the seventeenth century.a. Williams 
argued that the church needed to be protected against "worldly 
corruptions" which "might consume the churches if sturdy 
fences against the wilderness were not maintained."611 However, 
Williams and his followers believed that government had an ob-
ligation to establish a favorable climate toward religion which 
has been characterized as "positive toleration, imposing on the 
state the burden of fostering a climate conducive to all 
religion. "66 
Although Williams obviously had no direct influence on the 
drafting of the First Amendment, the religious tolerance prac-
ticed in Rhode Island was an example with which the framers of 
the First Amendment were familiar.67 Moreover, the example of 
. religious tolerance established by Williams persisted at the time 
of the American Revolution.68 Although familiar at the time, it is 
difficult to determine how much Williams and the Rhode Island 
model influenced the First Amendment.69 Neither Justice Black 
nor Justice Rutledge explicitly relied on Williams or the Rhode 
Island example in their opinions in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion70 which laid the groundwork for modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the long history of tolerance 
in Rhode Island and, to a lesser extent in Pennsylvania, stood at 
the time of the revolution as a monument to the sturdy fence 
between civil government on the one hand and religious estab-
63. The identification of these views is borrowed from TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1158-
61. 
64. See PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 98-101. 
65. PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 89, 98 (1953) . 
. 66. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1159 (citing Whitson, American Pluralism, THOUGHT 
402 (Winter, 1962)). 
67. PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 98-100. 
68. [d. at 116. 
69. Some historians of the first amendment do not even cite Williams as a source. 
See, e.g., ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CUR-
RENT FICTION (1985). 
. 70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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lishment on the other.71 
The writings of Thomas Jefferson are a second and more 
obviously direct source of the First Amendment. Jefferson's 
views on religious freedom are enigmatic. Jefferson advocated 
church/state separation as a way of protecting the state from the 
church. In his view, free debate of political ideas could take 
place only with complete separation of state and church. Conse-
quently Jefferson advocated a complete "wall of separation be-
tween Church and State."72 Although Jefferson himself was not 
a member of Congress when the Bill of Rights was adopted, his 
activities in the fight for the disestablishment of the Anglican 
Church in Virginia laid the ground work for the debate over the 
First Amendment.73 As President, Jefferson declined to offer a 
National Thanksgiving proclamation because of his belief that 
such a proclamation would violate the Establishment Clause.74 
During his presidency, however, Jefferson signed legislation pro-
viding for federal government support of a priest for certain In-
dians711 and authorized federal land grants to religious groups for 
the purpose of spreading the Christian gospel to the Indians.76 
The third source of traditional historical interpretations of 
the First Amendment is the writings of James Madison, the au-
thor of the First Amendment. Madison believed that religion 
and government would best function independently of each 
other. He thought that if the church and state were not sepa-
rated, they would corrupt. each other; the effect, he argued, 
would be "best guarded against by an entire abstinance [sic] of 
the Government from interference in any way whatever, beyond 
71. But see CURRY, supra note 62, at 19-21: 
Nevertheless, the stigma of its early radicalism clung, and the 
colony's later penchant for issuing paper money fortified its 
public image of irresponsibility, with the result that what was 
an extraordinary experiment in religious freedom turned out 
to be, apart from Rhode Island itself, an idea too advanced to 
achieve general acceptance. Ideas of freedom of religion that 
would later prosper and grow in colonial America would not be 
derived from the example of Rhode Island. 
72. Jefferson's famous quote is from a letter he wrote in 1801 in reply to an address 
by the Danb'ury Baptists Association. See PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 133. . 
73. [d. at 100-105. 
74. See CORD, supra note 69 at 39-41; PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 265-67. 
75. CORD, supra note 69, at 38-39. 
76. [d. at 41. 
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the necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect 
against trespass on its legal rights by others."?? Some historians 
have argued that in drafting the First Amendment, Madison was 
most concerned that the federal government be prohibited from 
establishing a national religion and that the government not 
provide discriminatory aid to one religious sect over another.?8 
However, others have pointed out that at the time he joined Jef-
ferson in the Virginia disestablishment fight, Madison advocated 
a complete disestablishment of church and state.?9 Despite this, 
he was active in establishing the Congressional chaplaincy and 
in making Thanksgiving proclamations while in Congress and as 
President.80 
These ambiguous and confiicting strains of thought, com-
bined with the confusing establishment practices of many of the 
colonies and the pervasively religious outlook of most eighteenth 
century Americans, provide a wild patchwork upon which to 
base historical interpretation of the amendment. 
The prevailing traditionalist interpretation81 of the First 
Amendment, formulated originally by Justices Black and Rut-
ledge, emphasizes those aspects of Madison's and Jefferson's 
writings which advocate a strict separation of church and state.82 
Proponents of this view have argued that it requires a complete 
separation between religion and government in order not to ad-
vance religion.83 The opinions forming the prevailing view draw 
77. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1159. 
78. CORD, supra note 69, at 46. 
79. See Madison's MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
quoted in PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 111-13 and CORD, supra note 69, at 20-23. 
80. CORD, supra note 69, at 29-36. Madison apparently later changed his mind on 
the constitutionality of the Congressional Chaplaincy. See PFEFFER, supra note 59, at 
248-49. 
81. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1159-60 .. 
82. Black and Rutledge did not ignore the conflicting practices of religious establish-
ment as some proponents of the revisionist view have implied. See, e.g., CORD, supra 
note 69, at xiii-xiv; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In fact Jus-
tices Black and Rutledge both carefully examine the ambiguous historical record in 
reaching their interpretation. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-11 (Black reviewing practices of 
religious persecution in the Colonies); id. at 13-14 (Black reviewing religious establish-
ments in early statehood); id. at 33 and n.11 (Rutledge reviewing colonial religious intol-
erance); Engel, 370 U.S. at 427-28 (Black reviewing practices of colonial and state 
establishments). 
83. See, e.g., PFEFFER, supra note 69; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion & Liberal De-
mocracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992). 
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heavily on the rhetoric of Madison and Jefferson regarding the 
Virginia disestablishment debate and upon the imagery of Jef-
ferson's metaphor regarding the "wall of separation".84 In addi-
tion, they minimize the conflicting practices of religious estab-
lishment in the colonies and in Madison's and Jefferson's lives, 
characterizing them as "an unfortunate fact of history."8& 
In addition to this "strict separationist" view advocated by 
traditional scholars, Jefferson's and Madison's writings have also 
spawned the neutrality principals which appear from time to 
time in both the Black/Rutledge interpretation and the revision-
ist approach to the Establishment clause. Thus, some scholars 
have argued that the Establishment Clause requires that govern-
ment be neutral on questions relating to religion.86 This latter 
group focuses on those parts of Madison's writings that speak of 
neutrality between sects and denominations.87 Both the neutral-
ity and separation ideas have been important a:spects of the 
Black/Rutledge formulation of the Establishment Clause and 
can be seen at various points in the Court's jurisprudence.88 Jus-
tice Kennedy's anti-coercion standard, for example, seems to be 
most directly steeped in the Madi.sonian concepts of neutral.ity. 
Recently revisionist historians of the First Amendment have 
argued that the Court has incorrectly interpreted the Williams/ 
Jefferson/Madison sources and has miscast the history and 
84. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-14, 16 (Black, J.); id. at 31-32, 33-41 (Rutledge, J. dis-
senting); Engel, 370 U.S. at 427-430. In setting the terms of the debate, Rutledge rea-
soned in Everson: "But the object [of the first amendment] was broader than separating 
church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding 
every form of public aid or support for religion." Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, 
J., dissenting). 
85. Engel, 370 U.S. at 427. 
86. See Everson, 330 U.S. at' 1 (Black, J.); id. at 28 (Rutledge, J. dissenting). See 
also Michael McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 933 (1986). Madison's neutrality language has also been the basis of the revision-
ist view that the establishment clause was only intended to prevent. government prefer-
ence of one religion over another. See CORD, supra note 69; Rodney Smity, Getting Off 
on the Wrong Foot and Back Again: A Reexamination of the Framing of the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 
20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984). 
87. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 86. 
88. As McConnell points out, principals of neutrality governed such early cases as 
Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) 
and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), while a strict separation philosophy seems to 
imbue cases such as Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See McConnell, supra note 86, at 935. 
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meaning of the First Amendment.89 Rather than focusing on the 
rhetoric of the early disestablishment leaders, these historians 
focus on their actions - the existence of state establishments of 
religion and the ambiguities in both Madison's and Jefferson's 
support of religious practices in government. They argue that 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was intended 
first, to protect state establishments of religion from interference 
by the national government; and second, to prevent the national 
government from establishing a national church or favoring one 
religious sect over another.90 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia have focused on this revisionist interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.91 Former Chief Justice Burger's opinion 
in Marsh also grew out of the revisionist historiography. 
III. THE OPINIONS IN LEE 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Lee involved a challenge to a religious invocation and bene-
diction offered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation in 
Rhode Island. The school principal decided that a rabbi should 
deliver an invocation and a benedication at the graduation cere-
mony. He also provided the rabbi with a copy of the school dis-
trict's "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" and suggested that the 
rabbi's prayers should be non-sectarian.92 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy concentrated on 
two aspects of the case in striking down the graduation prayer 
- the degree of involvement of the school officials in this partic-
ular religious activity and the impliedly coercive nature of the 
89. See, e.g., CORD, supra note 69; MICHAEL MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE 
INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); Smith, supra note 86. 
90. CORD, SUPRA note 69, at 49-50 (although Cord argues that "[no] substantial evi-
dence suggest[s] that non-discriminatory or indirect aid to religion or to religious institu-
tions was to come under the ban of the First Amendment"); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 
at 98, 106, 113; Smith, supra note 86, at 592-95. For a critique of this position see Doug-
las Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). 
91. Steven Smith points out that although Rehnquist never cites Cord, his reasoning 
in Wallace is based extensively on Cord's text. Steven D. Smith, Book Review, 6 CONST. 
COMM. 541, n.3 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HIS-
TORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION and ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, CHRISTIANITY AND 
STATE (1986». 
92. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-53. 
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activity. 
The Court first addressed the involvement of the public offi-
cials. In condemning the school officials' efforts to facilitate the 
graduation prayer, Justice Kennedy relied on the language of 
the Court's original school prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,93 reason-
ing that "[i]t is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of American people to re-
cite as a part of a religious program carried on by the Govern-
ment', . . . and that is what the school officials attempted to. 
do."94 Justice Kennedy rejected the school officials' argument 
that their good faith attempts to insure that the prayer would 
not be sectarian or result in divisiveness insulated the school 
from constitutional attack, stating: 
The question is not the good faith of the school in 
attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most 
persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking 
that enterprise at all when the object is to pro-
duce a prayer to be used in a formal religious ex-
ercise which students, for all practical purposes 
are required to attend.9G 
Furthermore, the majority rejected the argument that the 
nonsectarian nature of the prayer rendered it an acceptable gov-
ernmental accommodation of religion. In refusing to adopt the 
notion of a "civic religion" that does not offend the First 
Amendment, Justice Kennedy reasoned: 
If common ground can be defined which permits 
once conflicting faiths to express the shared con-
viction that there is an ethic and a morality which 
transcend human invention, the sense of commu-' 
nity and purpose sought by all decent societies 
might be advanced. But though the First Amend-
ment does not allow the government to stifle 
prayers which aspire to these ends, neither does it 
permit the government to undertake that task for 
itself .... [T]he idea of a civic religion [must be 
measured] against the central meaning of the Re-
93. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
94. 112 S. Ct. at 2656 (quoting Engel, 370 U.S. at 429). 
95.Id. 
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ligion Clauses of the First Amendment, which is 
that all creeds must be tolerated and none fa-
vored. The suggestion that government may es-
tablish an official or civic religion as a means of 
avoiding the establishment of a religion with more 
specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that 
cannot be accepted.98 
Finally, Justice Kennedy also rejected the argument that 
the graduation prayer was protected by the free speech provi-
sions of the First Amendment. He reasoned that: 
The explanation lies in the lesson of the his-
tory that was and is the inspiration for the Estab-
lishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of 
government what might begin as a tolerant ex-
pression of religious views may end in a policy to 
indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created ortho-
doxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and 
conscience which are the sole assurance that reli-
gious faith is real, not imposed.s7 
After indicating that the degree of involvement of the 
school officials in the shaping of the religious activity was sub-
stantial, Justice Kennedy explained that the prayer was imper-
missible because of the potentially coercive effect it might have 
on school children.98 To demonstrate the coercive nature of the 
prayer, Justice Kennedy first cited social science research on 
school children's susceptibility to peer pressure and their im-
pressionable nature. He also reasoned that the students would 
feel compelled by their classmates to attend the graduation cere-
mony.99 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy explained that the po-
tentially coercive effect of the prayer would be magnified be-
cause a student would be placed by the state in the position of 
96. [d. at 2656-57. 
97. [d. at 2658. 
98. [d. at 2658-61. Justice Kennedy observed, "[f)inding no violation under ... [the 
circumstances of this prayer) would place objectors in the dilemma of participating. with 
all that implies, or protesting. We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the 
affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the state may not, consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this position." [d. 
at 2658·59. 
99. [d. at 2559. 
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having to forego an important event such as graduation: 
[T]o say a teenage student has a real choice not 
to attend her high school graduation is formalistic 
in the extreme. True, Deborah could elect not to 
attend commencement without renouncing her di-
ploma; but we shall not allow the case to turn on 
that point. Everyone knows that in our society 
and in our culture high school graduation is one 
of life's most significant occasions. A school rule 
which excuses attendance is beside the point. At-
tendance may not be required by official decree, 
yet it is apparent that a student is not free to ab-
sent herself from the graduation exercise in any 
real sense of the term "voluntary", for absence 
would require forfeiture of those intangible bene-
fits which have motivated the student through 
youth and all her high school years. Graduation is 
a time for family and those closest to the student 
to celebrate success and express mutual wishes of 
gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing 
upon the young person the role· that it is his or 
her right and duty to assume in the community 
and all of its diverse parts. IOO 
553 
Justice Kennedy concluded his analysis of the indirect coer-
cive nature of the school graduation prayer by writing: 
The essence of the Government's position is that 
with regard to a civic, social occasion of this im-
portance it is the objector, not the majority who 
must take the unilateral and private action to 
avoid compromising religious scruples, here by 
electing to miss the graduation exercise. This 
turns conventional First Amendment analysis on 
its head. It is a tenet of the First Amendment 
that the state cannot require one of its citizens to 
forfeit his or her rights as the price of resist-
ing conformance to state-sponsored religious 
practice. IOI 
Justice Kennedy distinguished the graduation prayer in this 
100. [d. 
101. [d. at 2660. 
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case from Marsh v. Chambers,I°2 the Nebraska legislative prayer 
case. He indicated that the opening of a legislative session 
presents a situation involving adults who are free to enter and 
leave as they wish. In contrast, Justice Kennedy pointed out 
that the graduation prayer presents a situation in which, 
[T]eachers and principals must and do retain a 
high degree of control over the precise contents of 
the program, the speeches, the timing, the move-
ments, the dress, and the decorum of the stu-
dents. In this atmosphere the state-imposed char-
acter of an invocation and benediction by clergy 
selected by the school combine to make the 
prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in 
which the student was left with no alternative but 
to submit. lOS 
Justice Kennedy concluded the majority opinion by stating: 
The sole question presented is whether a religious 
exercise may be conducted at a graduation cere-
mony in circumstances where, as we have found, 
young graduates who object are induced to COh-
form. No holding by this Court suggests that a 
school can persuade or compel a student to par-
ticipate in a religious exercise. That is being done 
here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. lo• 
B. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, which was joined by 
Justices O'Connor and Stevens, emphasized the traditional 
Black/Rutledge approach to evaluating Establishment Clause vi-
olations. loli Justice Blackmun expressly rejected the coercion 
standard as a necessary element of the Establishment Clause vi-
olation by stating, "[a]lthough our precedents make clear that 
proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Estab-
lishment Clause violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure 
102. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
103. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 483 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986)). 
104. [d. at 2661. 
105. [d. at 2662-64. 
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to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that 
the government is endorsing or promot'ing religion. "106 Further-
more, in reasoning that co~rcion is not a necessary element of a 
violation, Justice Blackmun argued: 
We have believed that religious freedom cannot 
exist in the absence of a free democratic govern-
ment, and that such a government cannot endure 
when there is fusion between religion and the po-
litical regime. We have believed that religious 
freedom cannot thrive in the absence of a vibrant 
religious community and that such a community 
cannot prosper when it is bound to the secular. 
And we have believed that these were the animat-
ing principles behind the adoption of the Estab-
lishment Clause. To that end, our cases have pro-
hibited government endorsement of religion, its 
sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, 
whether or not citizens were coerced to 
conform. 107 
C. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRING OPINION 
Justice Souter also' wrote a separate concurring opmIOn 
which was joined by Justices O'Connor and Stevens for the pur-
pose of addressing two questions: first, "whether the [Establish-
ment] Clause applies to governmental practices which do not 
favor one religion or denomination over others," and second, 
"whether state coercion of religious conformity ... is a necessary 
element of an Establishment Clause violation."I08 
On the first question of the permissibility of "non-preferen-
tial" aid to religion, Justice Souter, after an independent review 
of the history of the Clause, concluded that: 
[W]hat we thus know of the Framer's experience 
und'erscores the observation of. one prominent 
commentator, that confining the Establishment 
Clause to a prohibition on preferential aid "re-
quires a premise that the Framers were extraordi-
narily bad drafters- that they believed one thing 
106. [d. at 2664. 
107. [d. at 2667 (quoting Schempp. 374 U.S. at 305). 
108. [d. 
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but adopted language that said something sub-
stantially different and that they did so after re-
peatedly attending to the choice of language" .... 
We must presume, since there is no conclusive ev-
idence to the contrary, that the Framer's em-
braced the significance of their textual judgment. 
Thus, on balance, history neither contradicts nor 
warrants reconsideration of the settled principle 
that the Establishment Clause forbids support for 
religion in general no less than support for one re-
ligion or some.10e 
Finally on the question of non-preferential aid for religion, 
Justice Souter reasoned that such a standard would place the 
court in the position of evaluating whether the particular reli-
gious practice was "ecumenical enough to pass Establishment 
Clause muster." Such an inquiry "invite[s] the court to engage 
in comparative theology," a practice surely forbidden by the 
First Amendment. Moreover, he indicated that the problem is 
not solved by saying that a state should promote religious diver-
sity, since such a standard would involve the court in evaluating 
the sufficiency of the number of religions and the frequency of 
state-sponsored religious observanceYo 
With respect to whether coercion is a necessary element of 
an Establishment Clause violation, Souter concluded that both 
the Court's precedent and a textual interpretation of the First 
Amendment indicate that coercion is not a necessary element. 
Souter's conclusion on the coercion issue rested on three argu-
ments. First, he reasoned that the court has consistently struck 
down non-coercive state practices as violations of the Establish-
ment Clause throughout the 20th century. Second, these prece-
dents are based on an appropriate reading of the First Amend-
ment. Souter pointed out that because the touchstone of a 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause is coercion, making that 
standard also the key to an Establishment Clause violation 
would render the latter clause meaningless: " 'the distinction be-
tween the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment 
109. [d. at 2670. 
110. [d. at 2671. 
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Clause violation need not be so attended.' "lll Finally, Souter ar-
gued that the post-adoption history of the Establishment Clause 
is ambiguous and inconclusive on the question of non-preferen-
tial aid to religion. As he concludes: 
To be sure, the leaders of the young Republic en-
gaged in some of the practices that separationists 
like Jefferson and Madison criticized. The first 
Congress did hire institutional chaplains, . . . and 
Presidents Washington and Adams unapologeti-
cally marked days of public thanksgiving and 
prayer, . . . . Yet in the face of the separationist 
dissent, those practices prove, at best, that the 
Framers simply did not share a common under-
standing of the Establishment Clause, and, at 
worst, that they, like other politicians, could raise 
constitutional ideals one day and turn their backs 
on them the next.1l2 
Finally, Justice Souter addressed the question of whether 
the government sponsored graduation prayer in question was a 
permissible accommodation of religious beliefs. He concluded 
that it was not. Souter reasoned that to be a permissible accom-
modation, a government practice must "lift a discernable burden 
on the free exercise of religion. "113 Because the students who 
wanted the prayer at graduation "had no need for the machinery 
of the state to affirm their beliefs,"114 Souter concluded that the 
prayer in question did not lift a discernable burden on free exer-
cise and was consequently not a permissible accommodation. 
D. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White and Thomas, wrote a scathing, dissenting opinion. llli 
111. [d. at 2673 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223; and citing Laycock, supra note 
90, at 922). 
112. [d. at 2675 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 and CORD, supra note 69, at 53. 
113. [d. at 2677 (citing Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 601, n.51; id. at 631-32 (opin-
ion of O'Connor, J.); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348, n. 8 (1987) (plurality opinion); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 
57 -58, n.45.) 
114. [d. 
115. The tone of Scalia's dissent is aptly illustrated by his opening paragraph: 
In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invoca-
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Justice Scalia would have upheld the graduation prayer in 
question based on several lines of reasoning. First, he opined 
that ceremonial prayer at public occasions is as old as our coun-
try and is an historically established national tradition. He 
pointed to the tradition of legislative prayer, prayer at presiden-
tial inaugurations, national Thanksgiving proclamations and the 
traditional presence of prayer at graduation ceremonies.116 Sec-
ond, Justice Scalia reasoned that participation in the graduation 
prayer was voluntary; students could have stood in "respectful 
silence", without participating in the religious observance,u7 Fi-
nally, Justice Scalia argued that the government involvement in 
the prayer was de minimis because the school officials did not 
draft, edit, screen or censor the prayers. ll8 The key to Justice 
Scalia's opinion is his view that voluntary, nonsectarian public 
prayer has become so much a party of the civic and social his-
tory of this country that it cannot be viewed as offensive to the 
Establishment Clause. 119 
IV. ANAL YSIS 
Justice Kennedy's opinion has' been haled in the press as a 
significant symbol that he has backed away from the "conserva-
tive precipice."12o Others have characterized Lee as the continu-
tions and Benedictions at public-school graduation ceremo-
nies, the Court - with nary a mention that it is doing so -
lays waste a tradition that is as old as public-school gradua-
tion ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an 
even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian 
prayer to God at public celebrations generally. As its instru-
ment of destruction, the bulldozer of social engineering, the 
Court invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test 
of psychological coercion, which promises to do for the Estab-
lishment Clause What the Durham Rule did for the insanity 
defense . . . . Today's opinion shows more forcefully than 
volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that 
fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon 
the changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of 
this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic 
practices of our people. 
Id. at 2678-79 (citations omitted). 
116. Id. at 2679-80. 
117. Id. at 2681-82. 
118. Id. at 2683. 
119. Id. at 2685-86 
120. In one story a commentator is quoted as saying that in the last three years 
Anthony Kennedy has undergone a "sea change". A Chaotic Court Closes its 
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ation of the traditionalist (Black/Rutledge) approach to Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence.121 Both of these characterizations 
read too much into the decision. What we should learn from 
Lee, when viewed with other recent Establishment Clause cases, 
is that Justice Kennedy will be the key and swing vote in these 
cases. Justice Kennedy's analysis under the coercion test, first 
announced in dissent in Allegheny County, will control the out-
come of Establishment Clause cases, at least until the make-up 
of the court again changes. Although Justice Kennedy's analysis 
deviates from the "wall of separation" metaphor, it is squarely 
rooted in the traditional Madisonian antecedents of the 
Amendment. 
Justice Kennedy's OpInIOn in Lee is thoroughly consistent 
with his earlier approach to the Establishment Clause and does 
not presage a departure from his earlier analysis. Commentators 
who have viewed his decision as a departure from his earlier 
analysis have focused too much on his statements in Allegheny 
County regarding the precedential value of Lemon. In addition, 
these commentators have not paid enough attention to the sub-
stance of his earlier decisions because Justice Kennedy has con-
sistently proposed that the coercion test replace Lemon.122 Jus-
tice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in the Allegheny County case 
indicates that he has long believed that coercion is a necessary 
element of an Establishment Clause violation. 
Although Justice Kennedy appears to be the only member 
of the Court persuaded by this coercion standard, it promises to 
be the touchstone of jurisprudence in this area until the makeup 
of the Court changes. When Justice Kennedy finds coercion pre-
sent, he will likely side with the more moderate Justices 
Term-Chaotically, CONNECTICUT LAW TRIBUNE, July 6, 1992, at p. 4. In another story, 
the writer noted that "[e]xhibit No. 1 in the case for Kennedy's conversion [from con-
servative to moderate] is Lee v. Weisman, ... " Kennedy's Constitutional Journey, LE-
GAL TIMES. July 6, 1992 at p. 1. 
121. See Eric Neisser, Civil Liberties as Family Values, NEW JERSEY L. J., Aug. 31, 
1992 at p. 16 ("Thus the decision actually expands the protections of the controversial 
school prayer cases of the 1960's .... "); Cancer Suit Against Cigarette Company AL-
lowed, NEW YORK L. J., June 25, 1992 at 1 ("The Justices refused, in their 5-4 decision, 
to use a school prayer dispute from Rhode Island to fashion a new interpretation of the 
Constitution's ban on "an establishment of religion."). 
122. Kennedy's statements in earlier opinions regarding the ongoing viability of 
Lemon have been interpreted as statements that he stood in the revisionist camp of 
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text. 
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(O'Connor, Stevens, Souter and Blackmun) to form a majority 
striking down the attempted government involvement with reli-
gion. Any governmental action rising to Justice Kennedy's 
tougher coercion standard would most assuredly fall within the 
more lenient Lemon test, even with Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment gloss. As Justice Blackmun noted in Lee, government coer-
cion of religious belief would certainly be enough to form the 
basis of a violation under Lemon, even though it is not required 
by Lemon. Areas likely to be controlled by this uncomfortable 
marriage between Justice Kennedy and the moderates are those 
involving active instances of religious exercise, with little and 
only subtle coercion necessary, when the participants in the ex-
ercise are young people. More coercion would be required if the 
participants are adults. Likewise, the greater the degree of goy-
ernment involvement, the less coercion necessary to show a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause. 
In contrast, when Justice Kennedy finds that no coercion is 
involved, he is likely to side with the revisionists to uphold the 
governmental involvement with religion. Justice Kennedy's 
opinion in Allegheny County, indicates that, absent a distinct 
finding of coercion, he is not willing to apply the Lemon 
formula. In this type of situation, Justice Kennedy's more ac-
commodationist views are likely to cause him to vote with the 
conservative block on the Court. Areas likely to be governed by 
agreement between Kennedy and the conservatives include 
those involving public display of religious symbols. 
While Justice Kennedy's approach to Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence cannot be characterized as a shift for him, it does 
signal that to the extent historical analysis governs the outcome 
of Establishment Clause cases, the Madisonian framework will 
control over the revisionist history advocated by Justices Scalia 
and Rehnquist. While Kennedy's approach to the traditional 
test is more conservative in general, he rejects a revisionist ap-
proach to the Establishment Clause which would allow any gov-
ernment involvement with religion that did not tend to establish 
a state religion. 
Although many traditionalists may not like to admit it, co-
ercion has been an underlying theme of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence throughout the reign of the Black/Rutledge his-
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torical interpretation.123 Even Engel, the main case cited for the 
proposition that non-coercive state actions can violate the Es-
tablishment Clause, relies, in part on a coercion rationale.12-l Fi-
nally, Madison's writings on religious liberty and on the Estab-
lishment Clause in particular refer consistently to the 
underlying theme of coercion. 1211 
However, Justice Kennedy's coercion standard does not pro-
vide any more substance to the Establishment Clause test than 
did the endorsement gloss advocated by Justice O'Connor.126 It 
is doubtful that the coercion test is so vacuous that, as Justice 
Scalia suggests, a disclaimer in the high school graduation pro-
gram stating that silence does not signify participation in the 
prayer, would alleviate the constitutional objection.127 Still the 
test has the problem of adopting a stilte.d and "non-real world" 
123. McConnell, supra note 86. Professor McConnell points out: 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court had paraphrased the 
establishment clause as 'forestalling compulsion by law of the 
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wor-
ship' and the presence or lack of compulsion, respectively, had 
been central to the Court's decisions in McCollum v. Board of 
Education and Zorach v. Clauson, which concerned release 
time programs in the public schools. And just one year before 
Engel, Chief Justice Warren had explained the distinction be-
tween Sunday closing laws and the release time program in 
McCollum on the basis that Sunday closing laws did not com-
pel religious participation. 
[d. at 934-35 (citing, in order, Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McGowan v. 
Md., 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961)). 
124. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31. ("This is not to say, of course, that [school prayers) 
do not involve coercion .... When the power, prestige, and financial support of the 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.") McConnell, supra note 86, at 935. 
125. Professor McConnell documents numerous instances of Madison's references to 
religious coercion including Madison's comments on the committee draft of the amend-
ment that he "apprehended the words to be, that Congress should not establish a reli-
gion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in 
any manner contrary to their conscience," and his writings in the Memorial and Remon-
strance on the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty. Professor McConnell argues that the 
"essence" of the Memorial and Remonstrance was the prohibition of legal compulsion to 
"support or participate in religious activities." McConnell, supra note 86, at 936-38 and 
authorities cited therein. 
126. In Mergens, Justice Kennedy expressly rejected the endorsement gloss on 
Lemon as providing insufficient substance by which to gauge constitutional violations. 
See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
127. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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definition of coercion that will have to be fleshed out over many 
cases. Traditionally, concepts of coercion have involved some no-
tion of compulsion,128 or at least some more immediate pressure 
than the sort of indirect psychological forces identified by Ken-
nedy in Lee. 
In addition, as a result of Justice Kennedy's own ambiva-
lence, the content of the coercion standard is hard to gauge. 
Such ambivalence is brought to the fore by Justice Kennedy's 
reaffirmation of the reasoning in Marsh, while at the same time 
striking down the prayer in Lee. 129 It is difficult to understand 
how the legislative prayer at issue in Marsh is not coercive 
under the standard set forth in Lee. Although not involving chil-
dren, the degree of government involvement in the religious ex-
ercise in Marsh was extreme. The legislative chaplain in Ne-
braska was hired by the legislature and paid with public funds. 
Justice Kennedy's distinctions that the audience for the legisla-
tive prayer was likely to be adults and that the audience was 
free to come and go as it pleased, are unconvincing. State tax 
payers were required to support a religious exercise with which 
they disagreed. The involvement of the government was so ex-
treme that it placed the imprimatur of the state on a particular 
form of religious exercise in Marsh; one that was identified with 
a particular denomination through the chaplain's affiliation with 
an organized church. Moreover, the religious exercise in Marsh 
took place in the halls of the government itself and was author-
ized by the highest government officials. Such an exercise is as-
suredly as indirectly coercive as the prayer in Lee. 
In the end, Lee does little to resolve the ongoing confusion 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and may contribute to it 
by adding another ambiguous overlay - coercion - to the al-
ready ambiguous Lemon formula. What is clear after Lee is that 
Justice Kennedy's vote will be key to the immediate future in 
the Establishment area. 
128. For example Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "[clompulsion; con-
straint .... " and defines "coerce" as "[clompelled to compliance; constrained to obedi-
ence, or submission in a vigorous or forceful manner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (rev. 
4th ed. 1968). 
129. 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61. 
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